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Abstract: In recent years, there have been a plethora of cases in which museums have had to 
release treasured pieces.  New legal initiatives and developments increasingly make repatriation 
claims by source nations and other single or group ‘original owners’ possible, most recently in 
the area of illicitly-trafficked antiquities.  Modern scholarship radically questions the genealogy 
and functions of the museum, and its relationship with the concepts of space, culture, and 
identity.  Much of the criticism comes from heretofore allied disciplines, in particular, 
archaeology.  Museums are now searching for strategies to protect their collections from the 
loss of authority and status that attend repatriation claims in this climate of criticism.  Yet, do 
museums collude in this loss of authority by joining in the ‘propertization’ of their collections?  
Embedded in the notion of modern museology is the primacy of the object.  This, arguably, 
aids the legal and political initiatives that permit deaccessioning of objects, imposing external 
requirements on the retention or return of certain types of collections, and regulating the 
relationship between the collector and the museum.  This article suggests that the complex of 
emerging laws and practices in the area of antiquities collecting points to a new understanding 
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‘And now, what’s going to happen to us without barbarians?’ 






The legal regulation of the trade in antiquities and of the activities of the museums 
that acquire and house them has generated some pressing questions about the 
future of the museum. Museums have been compelled to take stock of their 
historical implication in the trade in antiquities (legal and illegal), and address 
claims for the repatriation of artefacts acquired through illicit trafficking. Should 
museums continue to collect antiquities, or to contest demands for the repatriation 
of illicitly-trafficked antiquities? And, if not, how can they retain their value as 
cultural institutions?  A survey of academic and policy-directed commentaries 
written over the past fifteen years reveals some increasingly-polarised positions 
within the fields of museology and archaeology.1 As new strategies appear for 
retaining or repatriating antiquities, so do new models of engagement between the 
parties and new statements of the values that underlie the activities in this field.  
Each side couches its arguments in terms of preserving culture, protecting it from 
the loss that results from either repatriation or return of artefacts.  
There are signs that the legal regime of ‘cultural property’ is coming to an 
end, to be replaced by new approaches to managing the cultural heritage, as are 
the dichotomies of ‘cultural nationalism’ and ‘cultural internationalism’ that have 
so long defined it.2 Legal theorists are struggling to find replacements for the 
concept of property in this area.  On the one hand, objects are by definition 
                                                     
1 See Colin Renfrew, Loot, Legitimacy and Ownership:  The Ethical Crisis in Archaeology, Duckworth, 2000 and 
James Cuno, Who Owns Antiquity?  Museums and the Battle Over Our Ancient Heritage, Princeton University 
Press, 2008 (hereinafter ‘Who Owns Antiquity?’) for two of the clearest opposing positions in this area.   
2 For example, describing the developing landscape on which these conflicts occur, Francesco Francioni 
suggests that any simple distinction between ‘national’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ values is mistaken, as both 
the definitions of ‘cultural property’ and the law become increasingly complex. Francesco Francioni, 
‘Chapter 1:  The Evolving Framework for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in International Law’, in 
Silvia Borelli and Federico Lenzerini eds, Cultural Heritage, Cultural Rights, Cultural Diversity:  New 
Developments in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, pp. 3-25.  See also, James A R 
Nafziger, ‘The Present State of Research’ in The Cultural Heritage of Mankind, Center for Studies and 
Research in International Law and International Relations, Hague Academy of International Law, 2005. 
From a different perspective, John Carman argues that the concept of ‘property’ itself must be further 
understood by archaeologists, in order to comprehend the multiplicity of values that underlie legal and 
economic regulatory regimes in heritage management.  John Carman, Against Cultural Property:  
Archaeology, Heritage and Ownership, Duckworth, 2005.  Finally, Lyndel Prott and Patrick O’Keefe suggest 
that ‘property’ is now outmoded in the international arena; the work of UNESCO is focused on the 
protection of ‘heritage’, in part to avoid the constraints of property-based legal discourse.  Lyndel V 
Prott and Patrick O’Keefe, ‘”Cultural Heritage” or “Cultural Property”?’, International Journal of Cultural 
Property Vol.2, 1992, pp. 307-320.  See also Janet Blake, ‘On defining the cultural heritage’, International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly, 2000, pp. 61-85. 
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subject to property regimes,3 on the other, objects in museums signify across a 
range of different legal identities and regulatory regimes, which in turn access 
values that are derived from disciplines other than law.  These values themselves 
need to be examined.4  
Nevertheless, when it comes to law and legal regulation, the museological and 
archaeological communities generally continue to think in terms of ‘nationalist 
retention laws’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ or ‘encyclopedic’ museums, reaching for the 
clarity of defensible demarcation lines between positions, actors, and values.5  This 
is interesting, as such clear demarcations do not appear to exist between the 
disciplines of museology and archaeology themselves, which intersect productively 
at many points.  In the area of repatriation, as a whole, these communities work 
together to identify illicitly-trafficked objects and negotiate their return.6  It is also 
interesting because it represents a moment in the development of both disciplines 
in which external forces and internal imperatives have reshaped their habitation of 
the field of cultural production.  Archaeologists have always played many different 
roles in defining the landscapes which they themselves generate through 
excavation and study.  Museums, too, have always been purposive in the collection 
and display of culturally-significant objects.  Neither discipline understood itself as 
merely protective of culture; both accepted that culture was also destroyed by its 
practitioners. In recent years, the role of law in this debate has changed quite 
profoundly. Law is no longer taken as an institution external to the activities of 
both disciplines, but as a resource that museum professionals and archaeologists 
exploit in the pursuit of their respective agendas. What are the implications of this 
recruitment of legal forms?   
This question might be answered from many different perspectives.  The 
approach taken by this article is to examine emerging legal and regulatory 
strategies deployed in the area of repatriation, in order to propose that the recent 
                                                     
3 This is most true of antiquities in the field of cultural heritage law.  See Francioni, supra n. 2 pp. 3-6 for 
an expanded discussion of the various regimes – i.e., human rights, environmental law, etc. – which 
now also regulate cultural heritage more broadly. 
4 For example, ‘cosmpolitanism’ is increasingly proposed as the best depiction of the underlying values in 
cultural property discourse, replacing the concept of ‘cultural internationalism’, which is now seen as 
too limited.  How the notion of cosmopolitanism intersects with, or maps onto, the cultural property 
field requires its own analysis.  However, as a preliminary suggestion, it might be worth noting that 
‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘international’ are cognates rather than definitions of each other, and that the 
management of objects, no matter how politically motivated, is evidently, and profoundly, different 
than the self-directed politics of peoples.  In light of the relationship between cosmopolitanism and the 
Enlightenment project ( and thus the project that underlies the great ‘encyclopedic’ museums), see:  
Sheldon Pollock, Homi K Bhabha, Carol A Breckenridge, and Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
‘Cosmopolitanisms’, Public Culture 12(3), 2000, pp. 577-589; Peng Cheah, ‘Cosmopolitanism’, Theory 
Culture Society 23, 2006, pp. 486-496; Kwame Anthony Appiah, ‘Whose Culture Is It?’ in James Cuno, 
ed., Whose Culture?: The Promise of Museums and the Debate Over Antiquities, Princeton University Press, 
2009, pp. 71-86.   
5 There are of course critiques of such simplicity from many disciplines.  See for example, David A. Scott, 
‘Modern antiquities:  the looted and the faked’, International Journal of Cultural Property, Vol. 20, (2013), 
pp. 49-75 (Art History), and Mark Busse, ‘Museums and the things in them should be alive’, 
International Journal of Cultural Property Vol. 15 (2008), pp. 189-200 (Anthropology) for cogent and 
thought-provoking critiques of simple distinctions between ‘nationalism’ and ‘cosmpolitanism’. 
6 See, for example, n. 55, below.   
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polemical and dichotomous discourses regarding repatriation projects are 
mistaken.  The retentionist/universal line of critique is not only outmoded, as will 
be argued below, it is also unproductive.  After all, evidently both ‘sides’ of the 
discussion are right.7  This article looks at the demands made in/on the ‘law’ in the 
context of the greater shifts in the museological and national-patrimonial projects 
of the past few decades, with particular reference to the ongoing conflicts 
regarding the acquisition and return of antiquities.  The arguments made below 
seek to reframe the debate at its most fundamental level:  first, this article argues 
that museums themselves seek to take the position of ‘nations’ vis-à-vis their 
collections; far from shunning ‘nationalist retention laws’, encyclopedic museums 
claim their protection with increasing ferocity.  Second, it argues that the 
normalization of repatriation debates and the law that supports them is not in 
contradistinction to the museum project, it is a result of it.  The development of 
the disciplines of archaeology and museology, in tandem, has created the legal 
environment which both may experience as hostile.  This article is, therefore, a 
response to James Cuno’s position in Who Owns Antiquity?8; it is also an 
examination of the genealogy of the problems inherent in the repatriation debate.  
Finally, it seeks to move the discussion to a more productive platform than the 
endless restatement of outworn distinctions and political projects.  It concludes by 
considering a world in which there are no ‘outsiders’ or ‘enemies’:  what should 
the law protect if culture no longer needs protection from barbarians?  Possibly 
the most important use of the law in this area is to focus on the spaces that make 




REPATRIATION AND ANTIQUITIES:  THE CHANGING 
LANDSCAPE 
 
Over the past decade, leading national museums have been confronted with 
increasing numbers of demands for the repatriation of objects in their collections. 
In February 2013, the British Museum was threatened with a suit in the European 
Court of Human Rights as part of an ongoing attempt by Turkey to repatriate 
                                                     
7 In brief, of course universal or encyclopedic museums are important and should be protected, and of 
course repatriation requests should be honoured.  The work of ‘culture’ demands both. Any 
examination of the field will demonstrate competing values operating within it; these values remain 
important in themselves regardless of the conflicts in which they participate.  See  Tatiana Flessas, 
‘Sacrifical Stone’ Law and Literature 14(1), 2002, 49-84, for the argument that the assignment of identity 
and cultural ‘ownership’ is necessarily fictional (an agreement with Cuno et al.); and Tatiana Flessas, 
‘The Repatriation Debate and the Cultural Commons’ 17(3), Social and Legal Studies Journal, Special 
Issue, 2008, p. 387-405,  for the argument that the Declaration on the Importance and Value of the 
Universal Museum (2004) is more a strategic tool against the ‘slippery slope’ of repatriation claims, 
than a substantively meaningful position (an agreement with repatriation activists).         
8 See n.1, supra. 
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ancient artefacts.9  Turkey is also demanding the return of objects in the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City.10  Italy, Greece, Egypt, Iraq, and 
other ‘source’ nations are also engaging in aggressive legal, and quasi- or para-legal, 
initiatives to force the return of antiquities that they believe have been illegally 
looted from within their borders.11 Almost every week there is a new public 
discussion about the preservation, sale, or repatriation of antiquities.12  When 
facing repatriation requests, museums respond differently depending on the type 
of object requested and the legal requirements they have to satisfy,13 and on the 
specific policies of the museum itself.14  What is clear is that repatriation requests 
constitute one of the areas in which the relationship between museums, law, and 
the increasing interest in national patrimony is being renegotiated.15   As such, it is 
also a place of debate about the role of museums in the 21st century.   
The UK has 54 ‘national museums’,16 founded by Acts of Parliament and 
‘sponsored’ by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (hereinafter 
                                                     
9 Gareth Harris, ‘British Museum Faces Call for Repatriation of Artefacts’, Museums Journal, Issue 113/01, 
p. 13, January 1, 2013.  Available at: http://www.museumsassociation.org/museums-
journal/news/02012013-british-museum-faces-repatriation-call.     
10 Dan Bilefsky, ‘Seeking Return of Art, Turkey Jolts Museums’, N.Y. Times September 30, 2012.  
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/arts/design/turkeys-efforts-to-repatriate-art-
alarm-museums.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.    
11 Hugh Eakins, ‘The Great Giveback’, N.Y. Times, January 26, 2013.  See also, regarding the Marion True 
case and the practices at the Getty Museum, Jason Flelch and Ralph Frammolino, Chasing Aphrodite:  
The Hunt for Looted Antiquities at the World’s Richest Museum, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011  (see also: 
http://chasingaphrodite.com).   Hugh Eakins writes, in part referencing the Marion True case, that 
‘The news has become astonishingly routine: a major American museum announces it is relinquishing 
extraordinary antiquities because a foreign government claims they were looted and has threatened 
legal action or other sanctions if it doesn’t get them back’. 
12 Most recently, William Dalrymple, ‘Buried Treasure’, in The Guardian, June 1 2013. 
13 There are three areas in which museums typically face repatriation requests.  The first is in the area of 
antiquities.  The second is as regards human remains and associated sacred cultural objects. The third 
area is not strictly ‘repatriation’, as it involves the restitution of paintings looted in the Nazi era and 
claimed by descendants of the original owners.  However, it is an area in which museums are facing the 
loss of pieces of their collection on some of the same grounds as in the other two areas and to that 
extent should be noted.  In the UK and the US, they must now comply with legislation in these areas.  
In the UK, see:  the Human Tissue Act 2004, s.47 and the Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Act 
2009.  See also: Norman Palmer, Museums and the Holocaust, Institute of Art and Law, 2000.   
14 Even where there are clearly-defined legal requirements, there are disagreements on these issues within 
the museological establishment.  The British Museum displays very ancient human bodies (The British 
Museum Policy on Human Remains, 2005); the Manchester museum has implemented much stricter criteria 
for display (The Manchester Museum Policy on Human Remains, 2010).  There are museums that are 
sympathetic to the claims of nouveau-Pagans for control over the treatment (including possible 
reburial) of ancient skeletons, such as those discovered near Avebury.  ‘Give us back our bones, pagans 
tell museums’ Guardian, 5 Feb 2009.  Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2007/feb/05/religion.artnews. 
15 Museums in the UK and worldwide have had to address their policies in the face of increasing requests 
for repatriation of antiquities.  See, for example, the Policy Statement on Repatriation of Cultural 
Property by the Museums Association UK (September 2006), for an overview of repatriation requests 
and ethical issues faced by museums in the UK.  Available at: 
http://www.museumsassociation.org/publications/12913.   
16 These include the British Museum, the Victoria and Albert Museum, the Tate, the Wallace Collection, 
the Imperial War Museum, the Museum of London, the National Gallery, the National Portrait 
Gallery, the Natural History Museum, and other museums vulnerable to repatriation claims.  See 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/museums_and_galleries/3383.aspx.  The Museums 
Association estimates that ‘It is estimated that there are about 2,500 museums in the UK, depending on 
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‘DCMS’).17 These are ‘generally larger institutions that hold collections considered 
to be of national importance’.18    The national museums are run by Boards of 
Trustees, who are appointed by the Prime Minister.19  They have occupied a 
privileged legal position since their inception.20 The major national museums are 
exempt charities under the 1993 Charities Act (as amended by the 2006 Act).21 
They remain subject to the rules generally applicable to charities, but museum 
trustees have enormous discretion over the management and display of their 
collections.22  However, both in the UK and in the US, Trustees’ and museum 
directors’ discretion has always been limited in the area of deaccessioning pieces, 
which is traditionally regulated by the founding charter of the specific museum. 
This has been a strategically interesting position vis-à-vis repatriation claims.  
Museums may choose to petition for permission to return an object to its source 
nation, but cannot be held responsible for a refusal which is in line with their 
statutory obligations to retain their collections.23 Yet, increasingly, museums are 
being held accountable for acquisition practices rather than merely retention of 
their collections.  Collection development is at the core of the museological 
project, and, arguably, the expansion of the ethos of repatriation to cover not only 
specific objects of great cultural significance but all objects which may have been 
illegally acquired, strikes a blow at the core of museum functioning, authority, and 
identity.  Museum directors internationally are beginning to identify this 
development as an even greater threat to the museum project than the repatriation 
demands of the past.24   
                                                                                                                                       
what you include. Over 1,800 museums have been accredited by the Museums, Libraries and Archives 
Council (MLA)’. 
17 http://www.museumsassociation.org.   
18 Id.   
19 By contrast, in the US most museums are private not-for-profit corporations, administered by Boards 
of Trustees but not answerable to any governmental agency (with the exception of the National Gallery 
and the Smithsonian).  US museums may receive state and federal funding, but there is no Secretary or 
Ministry of Culture. 
20 DCMS allocates government funding, runs consultative processes and can insist on compliance with 
governmental policies and initiatives, but they are fundamentally ‘hands off’ in the running of these 
museums.  See http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/museums_and_galleries/3383.aspx. 
21 (Charities Act 1993, Schedule 2 §§ (k) – (z).)  The Charity Commission Guidance to Exempt Charities 
states that the exemption is because ‘they are considered to be adequately supervised by, or 
accountable to, some other body or authority.’ (Charity Commission, ‘CC23 – Exempt Charities’ (April 
2008).  Available at:  http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/publications/cc23.asp#4.). 
22 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dcms-as-principal-regulator-of-exempt-charities.  
23 For example, the British Museum Act 1963 allows deaccessioning in very limited circumstances (ss.3-6 
et seq., see also:  ‘BRITISH MUSEUM  POLICY ON DE-ACCESSION OF REGISTERED ITEMS 
FROM THE COLLECTION’, available at: http://www.britishmuseum.org/pdf/Deaccession.pdf).  
The British Museum Act 1963 (Amendment) Bill 2009-10, currently in its first reading in the House of 
Commons, is intended to expand the circumstances in which the British Museum may transfer objects 
from its collection to a different institution.   See http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2009-
10/britishmuseumact1963amendment.html.  More generally, see the Museums Association position on 
disposal, available at:  http://www.museumsassociation.org/download?id=15854.  
24 James Cuno, ed., Whose Culture?: The Promise of Museums and the Debate over Antiquities, Princeton 
University Press, 2012. 
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Certainly the collegial and mutually-profitable set of partnerships between 
curators, collectors, museum boards of directors, academics, and dealers that 
stocked the antiquities collections of the great national and private museums in the 
late 19th and 20th centuries is now under scrutiny, and often under attack, from 
both within and without the museological and national-patrimonial 
establishments.25  There are many interconnected reasons for this shift.  In part, 
this is a result of initiatives begun by archaeologists in the 1960s and 1970s,26 who 
were appalled at the loss of cultural context and academic knowledge which 
attends looting.27 In the 1990s, Professor Colin Renfrew, the former Director of 
the Illegal Antiquities Research Centre and a fellow at the MacDonald Institute for 
Archaeological Research at Cambridge University, spearheaded a campaign for 
museum accountability and due diligence regarding the provenance of these 
objects when they come to the market.28  Archaeologists were (and remain) equally 
appalled by the operation of the antiquities market, which relies on looted 
artefacts.  The chain of dealings between the original looters and the final high-end 
sale(s) to museums and private collectors by major antiquities dealers or in 
internationally-recognized auction houses is rarely entirely legal or straightforward.  
Not unusually, the journey of an artefact from its source to its final buyer is 
characterized by deliberate obfuscation of the origin of the pieces,29 forged export 
                                                     
25 There have been a great many books, articles, blogs, commentaries, and debates on the issues around 
the proper regulation of ancient objects.  See:  Brodie, Neil, Jenny Doole and Colin Renfrew, eds. Trade 
in Illicit Antiquities:  The Destruction of the World’s Archaeological Heritage, McDonald Institute for 
Archaeological Research 2001; David Gill, http://lootingmatters.blogspot.co.uk; Jennifer Anglim 
Kreder, ‘The Revolution in U.S. Museums Concerning the Ethics of Acquiring Antiquities’, 64 
University of Miami Law Review 997 (2009-2010).  Lyndel V Prott, ‘National and International Laws on 
the Protection of the Cultural Heritage’, in Kathryn W Tubb ed., Antiquities Trade or Betrayed:  Legal, 
Ethical and Conservation Issues, Archetype Publishers Ltd. 1995; Derek Fincham, http://illicit-cultural-
property.blogspot.co.uk. 
26  See Clemency Coggins, ‘Illicit Traffic of Pre-Columbian Antiquities’, 29 Art Journal 94 (1969). 
27 ‘Looting’ is not the same in different cultures and different times.  There is a long history of looting in 
various antiquities-rich nations; there are also differences between ‘subsistence’ looting and organized 
looting on a large scale.  See: Robert Mac Ginty, ‘Looting in the Context of Violent Conflict: a 
Conceptualisation and Typology’ Third World Quarterly 25(5) (2004), pp. 857-870; David Matsuda, ‘The 
Ethics of Archaeology, Subsistence Digging, and Artefact Looting in Latin America: point muted 
counterpoint’, International Journal of Cultural Property, 7(1) (1998) pp. 87-97. 
28 To make his point, Renfrew imagines what would have been the result if Philip of Macedon’s tomb at 
Vergina, Macedonia, had been discovered by looters rather than archaeologists: 
‘When objects are looted, all reliable context disappears, and it is likely that the objects would have 
been sold individually.  The scraps from which the great ivory shield was reconstructed would have 
been overlooked.  The arguments of attribution to Philip could not have been made.  The assemblage 
as a whole and its association with Vergina would have been lost.  Instead one would have been left 
with a number of isolated but rather special items occurring individually on the market.’ 
Colin Renfrew, Loot, Legitimacy and Ownership: The Ethical Crisis in Archaeology, London: Duckworth, 
2000, p. 24. 
29 Renfrew goes on to sketch the typical description of a looted object in an auction catalogue, which 
might conclude: ‘Found in Macedonia, Thrace or the Euxine Coast, reportedly during the First World 
War.  The property of a gentleman, acquired from a distinguished Greek family in Alexandria. […] The 
imprecision in the text as to place of origin would be deliberate, since no nation could then reliably 
claim ownership.  The suggestion of early discovery, impossible to contradict by means of 
documentation, would place the find well before 1970, the year of the UNESCO Convention.’  Id.   
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licenses,30 and the willingness of the sellers (and sometimes the buyers) to turn a 
blind eye to smuggling.31   
On the part of the source32 nations, the demand for the return of antiquities 
is also part of the continuing processes of decolonisation, and often of nation-
building.33  As in the recent case of Turkey’s demand for the repatriation of looted 
antiquities, above, source nations argue that looting must have been the de facto 
means by which antiquities reached the market.34  The argument is underpinned 
by these nations’ reliance on modern geographical boundaries, although they may 
also claim artefacts based on ancient or historical territories.  Public museums are 
subject to the requirements in international directives and Conventions signed and 
ratified by the States Parties to them.  International instruments generally break 
down into two broad categories.  The first is protection of cultural property from 
destruction; these international instruments derive from the classical international 
law of war.  Although their focus is protection, they are used for repatriation, as 
they include sections or accompanying Protocols that mandate signatories to aid in 
returning illegally taken property.35 The second is control over the illegal export or 
import of cultural property, and its return to the source nation.  If ratified, these 
impose positive obligations to repatriate stolen or looted cultural property, and to 
use or enact national legislation to prevent museums and other institutions from 
acquiring property that has been illegally exported from other states.36 These 
international instruments are given effect by domestic statutes.37    
                                                     
30 For a particularly evocative description of this, see Peter Landesman, ‘The Curse of the Sevso Silver’, 
The Atlantic, November 1, 2001.  Available at: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/11/the-curse-of-the-sevso-silver/302331.   
31 See  Jason Flelch and Ralph Frammolino, Chasing Aphrodite:  The Hunt for Looted Antiquities at the World’s 
Richest Museum, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011; David Gill and Christopher Chippindale, ‘From 
Malibu to Rome:  Further Developments on the Return of Antiquities’, International Journal of Cultural 
Property 14(2) (2007), pp. 205-240. 
32 Jane Warring cautions against the unreflective use of the terms ‘source’ and ‘market’ nations.  This 
article follows her formulation that ‘the terms “market” and “source” are not meant to invoke guilt or 
evoke sympathy, but rather to express an economic reality; source nations possess a very valuable, 
inadequately protected, and highly desirable commodity that market nations demand, for various social 
and economic reasons’.  Jane Warring, ‘Underground Debates:  The Fundamental Differences of 
Opinion that Thwart UNESCO’s Progress in Fighting the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property’, 19 Emory 
Internationall Law Review 227, 233 (2005) at n.32. 
33 See, generally, Barbara T Hoffman, ed., Art and Cultural Heritage:  Law, Policy and Practice, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006; and Lyndel V Prott ed., Witnesses to History:  Documents and Writings on the Return of 
Cultural Objects, Stationary Office Books, 2009. 
34 ‘We know 100 percent that these objects at the Met are from Anatolia,’ the Turkish region known for 
its ancient ruins, Mr. Suslu, an archaeologist, said in an interview. ‘We only want back what is rightfully 
ours.’ Bilefsky, n.2 supra.  
35 An example is the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict (recently ratified by the US on March 13, 2009, not yet signed by the UK), its fore-
runners and its Protocols, especially the 1954 Protocol which ‘requires occupying powers to prevent 
the illegal export of cultural material and to seize and return illegal imports’.  James A R Nafziger, ‘The 
Present State of Research’ in The Cultural Heritage of Mankind, Center for Studies and Research in 
International Law and International Relations, Hague Academy of International Law, 2005, pp.200-1. 
36 The second type of international instrument is more narrowly focused on controlling the movement of 
cultural artefacts and art.  The UK signed the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting 
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property on October 
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Where the objects have entered the market recently, source nations rely on 
national patrimonial laws, increasingly stringently enforced,38 in conjunction with 
international conventions, in order to make sweeping requests for the return of 
antiquities.  At issue are usually illegal export or title disputes, and usually both.39  
As a brief overview, in the UK and the US, these cases usually proceed by way of a 
two-part legal argument, in which the first step is to establish the ownership of the 
objects by the claiming or source nation, and the second is to determine whether 
the objects where illegally exported or sold.  The courts apply lex situs40 and the 
criminal law of the market nation to determine the issues.  The most recent case of 
this kind in the UK is Republic of Iran v Barakat Galleries41, in which the State of Iran 
sought to reclaim ancient artefacts from an antiquities dealer.  The Court of 
Appeals overturned a High Court decision in favour of Barakat,42 applying lex 
situs to determine that Iran was in fact the true owner of the goods.  It was crucial 
to the decision that the UK had recently signed the 1970 UNESCO Convention.  
The Appellate Court judge in Barakat found that the court was bound to give 
effect to the intention of the government to act in accordance with the provisions 
of the 1970 Convention and classified the claim in Barakat as a ‘patrimonial claim’ 
                                                                                                                                       
31, 2002.  Of particular interest is its requirement that ‘”consistent with national legislation”, parties 
must prevent museums and similar institutions from acquiring property illegally exported from other 
States.’ The 1970 Convention contains other requirements which attempt to ‘compromise between the 
interests of art-importing and art-exporting States, while requiring the importing State’s co-operation in 
the recovery and retrieval of illicitly exported property’ (Nafziger, Id p.202).  More recently, the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects was designed to supplement 
the 1970 Convention.  Nafziger writes that ‘The aim was to focus on questions of private law 
associated with illicit trafficking that were not addressed by the 1970 UNESCO Convention and 
thereby strengthen the protective regime’ (Nafziger, Ibid pp. 250-1). This Convention applies 
prospectively only, and has not yet been signed by the US, the UK, France or many other ‘market’ 
states.   
37 In the UK, these turn on the preservation of cultural objects and the prevention of illegal excavation or 
export of these objects and objects illegally excavated or imported from abroad.  The two most 
important are the Dealing in Cultural Objects Act (2003), which makes it illegal to deal in objects 
known to have been illicitly excavated or exported after December 30, 2003; and the Iraq (United 
Nations Sanctions) Order (2003) prohibits the ‘importation or exportation of any illegally removed 
Iraqi cultural property’. Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order (2003), § 8 (1) – (6) Illegally Removed 
Iraqi Cultural Property. Other domestic statutes which affect museums and museum practices include 
the Export of Objects of Cultural Interest (Control) (2003), and the Treasure Act 1996, which spurred 
the creation of the Portable Antiquities Scheme. The US and the EU member states have their own 
complex of legislation implementing UN directives, nationalizing their own cultural property, 
providing for the protection of cultural objects, and preventing illicit dealings in art and antiquities. See:  
Kelley Elizabeth Yasaitis ‘Case Note: National Ownership Laws as Cultural Property Protection Policy: 
The Emerging Trend in United States v. Schultz’ (2005) 12 International Journal of Cultural Property 95-113.  
38 And at times very recently promulgated, as in the case of the People’s Republic of China:  see Stefan 
Gruber, ‘Protecting China’s Cultural Sites in Times of Rapid Change:  Current Developments, Practice 
and Law’, Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 10(3 & 4), 2007.  However, China is not alone in 
this.  Many other ‘source’ nations are now enforcing their national patrimonial statutes with increased 
stringency.   
39 See Janet Ulph and Ian Smith, The Illicit Trade in Art and Antiquities:  International Recovery and Criminal and 
Civil Liability, Hart Publishing, 2012.   
40 For discussion and critique of this position, see Derek Fincham, ‘How Adopting the Lex Originis Rule 
Can Impede the Flow of Illicit Cultural Property’, 32 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 111 (2008). 
41 Republic of Iran v Barakat Galleries [2007] EWCA Civ 1374. 
42 The lower court judge had found that the Iranian law relied upon by the Republic of Iran was both 
penal and public, following Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz & others [1983] 2 All ER 931 (HL). 
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which could appropriately be heard in an UK court.  This combination of a 
‘blanket’ (or ‘blank cheque’) national patrimonial statute in the source nation, 
backed by domestic law in the market nation, often with reference to a statute 
either giving effect to, or interpreted in light of, an international Convention, is the 
emerging pattern of repatriation cases.  In the case of antiquities that were 
acquired well before the modern era of international cultural property protection 
instruments, source nations claim that the excavation and removal of these objects 
is a form of theft that should be redressed, and use national patrimonial statutes, if 
available, in conjunction with standard doctrines of contract and property law in 
order to insist on their return.  The result is that any antiquity in almost any 
‘market’ nation museum is now vulnerable to a repatriation claim.43 
This situation has not only changed the landscape on which museums acquire 
antiquities, but also on which they carry out their day-to-day business.  Museums 
are particularly vulnerable to censure as they intersect with the market at a variety 
of different points.  They are not merely ‘holders’, ‘keepers’ or ‘owners’ of 
antiquities, they are also collectors and the beneficiaries of collectors. They are 
vulnerable to repatriation requests in each of these roles.  Increasingly, when these 
requests are made, they are made aggressively, publicly, and are couched in legal or 
quasi-legal terms that cut through the web of self-regulation and professional 
relationships that museums constantly evolve with source nations and dealers.44  
Furthermore, this level of repatriation activity and public censure affect the future 
capabilities of museums to build up their collections.45  Whereas human skeletons 
and art looted in WW2 can be returned with general agreement that the practices 
of collecting these kinds of materials should be stopped, the case of antiquities is 
different.  The antiquities market in its entirety is largely suspect.46  At the same 
                                                     
43 ‘Although Turkey ratified the convention in 1981, it is now citing a 1906 Ottoman-era law — one that 
banned the export of artifacts — to claim any object removed after that date as its own.’ Bilefsky, n.2, 
supra. 
44 See Hugh Eakins, ‘The Great Giveback’, N.Y. Times, January 26, 2013. 
45 See Daniel Grant, ‘Is It Possible to “Collect” Antiquities These Days?’ Huffington Post, April 5, 2011.  
Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-grant/antiquities-collecting-due-
diligence_b_844838.html.   
46 The functions and (il)legality of the antiquities market are complex, and much is still not known about 
it.  For example, one estimate is that the black market alone is worth about $6 billion per year, but this 
figure cannot be confirmed.  See Mark V Vlasic and Tess Davis, ‘When Museums Do the Right Thing’, 
N.Y. Times, May 17, 2013.  For discussion and description of the licit, illicit and ‘grey’ markets in 
antiquities, see:  Simon MacKenzie and Penny Green, ‘Criminalising the Market in Illicit Antiquities:  
An Evaluation of the Dealing Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003 in England and Wales’, in S. 
MacKenzie and P. Green eds., Criminology and Archaeology:  Studies in Looted Antiquities, Oxford:  Hart, 
2009; Blythe A. Bowman, ‘Transnational Crimes Against Culture:  Looting at Archaeological Sites and 
the “Grey” Market in Antiquities’, 24 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 225 (2008); Neil Brodie, 
'Uncovering the Antiquities Market'. In R. Skeates, C. McDavid and J. Carman eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of Public Archaeology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp.230-252; Jennifer Anglim 
Kreder, ‘The Revolution in U.S. Museums Concerning the Ethics of Acquiring Antiquities’, n.7, above; 
Christine L Green, ‘Antiquities Trafficking in Modern Times:  How Italian Skullduggery Will Affect 
United States Museums,’ 14 Villanove Sports and Entertainment Law Journal 35 (2007). 
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time, it is the raison d’etre of museums to house (and study, and make available to 
the public) their collections.47   
Over the past two decades, museums have engaged in a great deal of self-
regulation, in response to archaeologists’ arguments and to the changing attitudes 
of source nations (as well as to changes in the museological project overall, as will 
be discussed below).  The Museums Association of the UK, DCMS, as well as 
many other museums in the UK and abroad, have adopted various procedures to 
ensure due diligence when acquiring antiquities.  The most common is known as 
the ‘1970 rule’ under which museums take as their cut-off date the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, and do not acquire antiquities 
which lack clear documentation of provenance and title back to 1970.48 The 
Association of Art Museum Directors agreed in 2008, and again in 2013, to follow 
this ‘rule’.49  However, this has always been applied on a case-by-case basis, 
differently by different museums, and in any event is insufficient.50  Museums also 
increasingly return objects under the terms of Memoranda of Understanding 
(MoU’s).  These may be made between nations51 or between museums and other 
organizations.52  In addition, all museums have internal policies on repatriation, 
and each case is carefully considered.  Although at times this heightened concern 
is recognized,53 it might be increasingly naïve for any museum to believe that self-
regulation will ever suffice. Claims for repatriation of cultural objects are 
characterized by long-standing and very heated debates about the values 
                                                     
47 The International Council of Museums (‘ICOM’) states:  ‘A museum is a non-profit, permanent 
institution in the service of society and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves, 
researches, communicates and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its 
environment for the purposes of education, study and enjoyment.’  ICOM Statutes, 2007.   
48 Patty Gerstenblith, Expert Report on the 1970 UNESCO Convention (UNESCO 2012). 
49 AAMD New Report on Acquisition of Archaeological Materials and Ancient Art (2008); Introduction to the 
Revisions to the 2008 Guidelines on the Acquisition of Archaeological Material and Ancient Art (Adopted by the 
AAMD Membership 29 January 2013). 
50 Jason Flelch and Ralph Frammolino, Chasing Aphrodite:  The Hunt for Looted Antiquities at the World’s 
Richest Museum, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011, pp.4-5.  See also:  Randy Kennedy, ‘Museum 
Leaders Toughen Artifact Acquisition Guidelines’, N.Y. Times, January 30, 2013. 
51 See, for example:  Agreement Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of 
The Republic Of Italy Concerning The Imposition Of Import Restrictions On Categories Of Archaeological Material 
Representing The Pre-Classical, Classical, And Imperial Roman Periods Of Italy  (available at: 
http://eca.state.gov/files/bureau/it2001mou.pdf) and The Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China Concerning The 
Imposition of Import Restrictions on Categories of Archeological Materials From the Paleolithic Period Through the 
Tang Dynasty and Monumental Sculpture and Wall Art At Least 250 Years Old (available at: 
http://eca.state.gov/files/bureau/ch2009mou.pdf).  
52 Interestingly, in  2006 ‘the British Museum and the Museums, Libraries & Archives Council announced 
a Memorandum of Understanding with eBay, whereby the Department of Portable Antiquities & 
Treasure monitors eBay for items of potential Treasure, questions vendors and notifies the 
Metropolitan Police’s Art & Antiques Unit of any unreported items. Upon formal notification from the 
police, eBay are required to end the sale, and the police may investigate further.’ Available at: 
http://www.heritagegateway.org.uk/gateway/news/detail.aspx?ctid=101&id=4844.  
53 See Mark V Vlasic and Tess Davis, ‘When Museums Do the Right Thing’, N.Y. Times, May 17, 2013.    
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underlying ‘ownership’ and entitlement, 54 and beyond that, about how to frame 
the debate in the first instance.55   
These legal developments form an important part of the scaffolding on which 
the museological community, government agencies, the public, and academics 
query the changing role(s) of museums overall.  If on the one hand the discussion 
of the ‘changing role’ or ‘future’ of museums is a benign reflection of commitment 
to core values such as relevance and community service,56 on the other, there is an 
unavoidable undertow of criticism, defensiveness, and anxiety in the discussion.  
The emerging multifocal sites of legal and quasi-legal attack on museum practices 
and collections require the great museums that house these artefacts to search for 
more solid ground from which to negotiate their responses to repatriation.  After 
all, the injustice of a museum always, structurally, being on the wrong side of a 
repatriation request is evident:  museums may be looted themselves, as in the 2003 
Iraq conflict; they may also be the recipients of collections of objects swept up 
during war, ongoing postcolonial struggles, civil wars that erupt after international 
military actions, and other forms of violent conflict.  In the latter cases, the 
ongoing rhetorical conflation of ‘collector’ and ‘saviour’ which began in the 17th 
and 18th centuries and has been often aired since, takes on new life.57  Finally, until 
the recent spate of returns via the threat of legal action, most repatriation 
happened quietly as a result of careful scholarship and negotiations with source 
nations.58   
 The search for new ground from which to exert authority takes on both a 
new critique of the existing law, and a reformulation of the museum project.  The 
legal critique is based on the rejection of the national patrimonial laws described 
above.  In an early formulation of this position, Geraldine Norman wrote in ‘Bad 
laws are made to be broken’ that  
 
                                                     
54 For example, the perspective that ‘There is a basic, underlying conflict between the museums’ humanist 
perspective and an essentially political vision in which art is first and foremost the property of 
individual nations.’  Kate Fitz Gibbon, ‘Dangerous Objects:  Museums and Antiquities in 2008’, 
available at:  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1479424.  
55 Jane Warring, ‘Underground Debates:  The Fundamental Differences of Opinion that Thwart 
UNESCO’s Progress in Fighting the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property’, 19 Emory Internationall Law 
Review 227 (2005).  See also:  John Henry Merryman, ‘Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property’, 
80 American Journal of International Law 831 (1986) and Paul M Bator, ‘An Essay on the International 
Trade in Art’, 34 Stanford Law Review 275 (1982) for early and very influential paradigms of analysis.  As 
importantly, see Norman Palmer, Museums and the Holocaust, Institute of Art and Law, 2000, for the 
argument that perhaps law is not the correct vehicle for regulation in this area at all.   
56 See, for example, the Museum Association’s ‘Museums 2020’ project, which asks a wide range of 
participants to comment on how museums should remain relevant into the future.  Available at:  
http://www.museumsassociation.org/museums2020.  
57 See ‘Report from the Select Committee on the Earl of Elgin’s Collection of Sculptured Marbles, &c.’ 
House of Commons 1816, p.20.  These arguments are rehearsed into modernity, most poignantly by 
the international community recently mourning the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban 
in Afghanistan in 2001.   
58 For an interesting example, see:  http://egyptology.blogspot.co.uk/2009/05/clarification-myers-
museum-collection.html . The Myers Museum at Eton recently returned 454 ancient artefacts to Egypt 
of its own volition in 2009. 
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A total export ban is […] illogical in countries where customs officers are 
easily bribed.  Moreover, it seems crazy to try and keep every artefact that is 
unearthed in the country of its origin. … Export controls which permit the 
sale of duplicates or less important pieces make cultural and financial sense. 
[…] If the laws were internationally perceived as fair, upright people would 
not break them.  At present, in deed if not in word, the whole of the 
antiquities trade and most museum curators condone antiquities smuggling 
[because] […] the laws in the countries of origin make no sense.59 
 
This position has since been refined by James Cuno, current President and CEO 
of the J Paul Getty Trust, the institution that has been more castigated recently 
than any other for participation in the illegal antiquities trade.60   
In Who Owns Antiquity?,61 Cuno argues that museums should be permitted to 
acquire antiquities without special regard to provenance or illegal 
excavation/export, as the present legal regime neither stops the illicit trade in 
antiquities nor permits museums (and through them, curators, scholars, and the 
public) to learn from and be inspired by these ancient objects.62  Cuno’s point is 
that the laws put in place to ‘protect’ antiquities from looters do not work,63 and 
that they are made in the interests of nationalism:   
 
The real argument over the acquisition of undocumented (unprovenanced) 
antiquities is not what it appears to be.  It is not really between art museums 
and archaeologists, about the protection of the archaeological record from 
looting and illicit trafficking in antiquities.  It is between museums and 
modern nation-states and their nationalist claims on that heritage.  
Archaeologists are part of the argument as allies of those states […].64 
 
Cuno states that ‘in many respects, when faced with the choice whether or not to 
acquire an undocumented antiquity, the looting of the archaeological site has 
already occurred and the knowledge that may have been gained from […] context 
has already been lost’.65  Therefore, the only decision that a museum has to make 
is whether or not to acquire such an antiquity, and ‘putting aside the legal risks for 
a moment’, why not acquire? He acknowledges that archaeologists disagree with 
                                                     
59 Geraldine Norman, ‘Bad laws are made to be broken’ in Kathryn W Tubb, ed., Antiquities Trade or 
Betrayed:  Legal, Ethical and Conservation Issues, Archetype Publishers Ltd. 1995, p. 143. 
60 This can be seen in the case recently dropped in Italy, in which Marion True, the ex-curator of 
antiquities at the Getty Museum, and Robert Hecht, an art dealer, were prosecuted for allegedly 
trafficking in illegally excavated antiquities in 2002.  The Marion True controversy demands its own 
article, and is cited here only to point out the large amounts of public criticism of the Getty’s collecting 
practices since the case began in 2005.  See:  Chasing Aphrodite, n.3 supra; Elisabetta Provoledo, ‘Time 
Limit Ends Antiquities Case of Ex-Curator’, The N.Y. Times, October 14, 2010. 
61See n.1, supra. 
62 Ibid p.7, 
63 Ibid pp.43 and xxxv. 
64 Ibid p. xviii. 
65 Ibid p.7. 
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this position for many reasons, but believes that the public interest in making 
these antiquities available for display and study (and keeping them out of private 
collections or the black market) trumps purely archaeological concerns.   
To begin with, archaeologists argue that Cuno’s position is based on a 
misrepresentation of the nature of the market in antiquities.  Ricardo J Elia writes 
of Norman’s argument – and, by implication, of Cuno’s – that it relies on a 
‘mythology of the market’ rather than on a true understanding of the complexity 
of the interactions and participants.66 Second, looters and dealers participate in a 
market with the expectation, often, that museums will be the ultimate purchasers. 
Renfrew emphasises this point, suggesting that Cuno is effectively arguing against 
the ‘1970 rule’:  
 
By implication he criticises more cautious institutions such as the British 
Museum or the Archaeological Institute of America which agree to follow the 
‘1970 rule’ in order to combat the traffic in illicit antiquities and the 
destruction of archaeological sites which sustains it.67  
 
Without dismissing Cuno’s arguments for the ‘encyclopedic museum’, Renfrew 
draws attention to the considerable discretion that museum curators have, and to 
the persistence of evidence of shady dealings with traffickers and collectors.  
Illegal collecting, on the part of museums as well as private collectors, leads to 
destruction of archaeological sites and ‘the massive loss to knowledge which 
ensues when saleable antiquities are separated, without record, from the context of 
their discovery’.68  Ultimately, Renfrew’s point is that Cuno’s ‘musings on ethnicity 
and nationalism are not centrally relevant to the problem of safeguarding the 
world’s cultural heritage. For clearly the competent territorial authorities must 
have the main responsibility for safeguarding archaeological sites: ethnicity is not 
the issue’.69   
Cuno argues that archaeologists’ work is co-opted by the nation-state for use 
in creating ‘national’, as opposed to ‘encyclopedic’, museums, and that the 
‘encyclopedic museum’, resting on the values of ‘cosmopolitanism’70 is the victim 
                                                     
66 Ricardo J Elia, ‘Comment on “Irreconcilable Differences?”: Scholars for Sale.’  Papers from the Institute of 
Archaeology 18 (2007), pp.16-18, at p.16: ‘For decades the antiquities market has promoted a unitary 
vision of how objects come to the market. This vision acts as a mythology that sanctions the collection 
of antiquities, blames the victims, and denies the reality of archaeological site looting. It is a fantasy 
world where source countries are repressive villains and collectors are heroes, where the economic 
forces of supply and demand have no effect, and where every one of the thousands of museum-quality 
antiquities that appear on the market each year comes from old collections or chance finds made by 
poor peasants. In the fantasy world of the antiquities market, systematic looting by criminal gangs does 
not exist, archaeologists are dreary Philistines who don’t appreciate beauty, and archaeological context 
does not matter.’  
67 Colin Renfrew, ‘Book Review’, in The Burlington Magazine, November 2008, p.768. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Cuno cites Kwame Antony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, W.W. Norton, 2006; as 
well as Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, Princeton University Press, 2005.  He also looks to the work of 
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of these short-sighted laws.  Cuno, Neil MacGregor (the Director of the British 
Museum), and others claim that the use of national patrimonial laws and the threat 
of criminal prosecution are the latest approaches to a conflict that is not truly legal:  
who can ‘own’ artefacts from cultures that are long gone?  Shifting national 
borders, religions, and governments mean that claims based on location should 
not be the criterion for the attribution of ownership.71 Cuno invokes the 
observations of Neil MacGregor on the encyclopedic nature of the British 
Museum: 
 
[…] the British Museum was established for the whole world on the premise 
that the study of things gathered together from all over the world would 
reveal the truth and ‘not one perpetual truth, […] [but] truth as a living, 
changing thing, the truth constantly remade as hierarchies are subverted, new 
information comes, and new understandings of societies emerge.  And as 
such truth emerged, it was held, it would change those societies and the result 
would be tolerance.   
 
The British Museum’s collection was formed as a means to knowledge and a 
way of creating a new kind of citizen for the world.  That it was in London 
was only because London met its founder’s terms:  his collection would be 
kept together and would be open, free to any and all interested persons.  It 
could easily have been in another European capital but at the time, London 
was the most cosmopolitan and largest city in all of Europe.  It was presumed 
that more – and more different – people would experience the collection in 
London than anywhere else.72 
 
It is worth reproducing this quotation at length because it demonstrates the 
various strands that Cuno and MacGregor weave together.  It is true that ‘culture’ 
cannot be confined by national borders – or any borders at all.  It is also true that 
‘artefacts’ are not, as such, ‘culture.’  The relationships between objects, 
collections, scholarship, and museums are complicated, and untangling them 
requires more than either the straightforward motivations that Cuno assigns to 
source nations or the disinterested posture he assigns to ‘encyclopedic’ museums.73 
On the surface, there are relatively straightforward critiques of Cuno’s 
argument.  First, it may have been true in 1753 that only London met its founder’s 
terms, but certainly other cities would do so in the 21st century:  Sir Hans Sloane 
                                                                                                                                       
Edward Said and Amartya Sen to underscore the crucial importance of the non-parochial vision of life 
and knowledge.   
71 Ibid Chapter 5, ‘Identity Matters’, pp.121-145, at p.125:  ‘Nationalist retentionist cultural property laws 
are based on false assumptions about art and culture:  that the parameters of art and culture can be 
fixed – that the currents of influence can be stopped – and identified as national, as having national 
characteristics.’ (emphasis in original). 
72 Ibid pp. xxiv-xxxv. 
73 For example, merely generating a site of national heritage, or merely being motivated by the desire to 
educate. 
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was an Englishman based in London, and surely that is also significant (as it would 
be today).  Second, at this point, his collection could ‘be kept together and would 
be open, free to any and all interested persons’ anywhere in the world.  Third, is 
London still the most ‘cosmopolitan and largest city in all of Europe’?  These are 
arguments based on past realities, couched as justifications for the future, and they 
reference the well-known ‘classical’, secular-sacred, enlightenment project model 
of the museum.  Indeed, later in the analysis, this article will return to the 
questions of ‘the past’, if only to argue that Cuno and others are attempting to 
return to a past state of affairs vis-à-vis the deference that museums used to 
experience as of right from actors outside of the museological community.74  
There are also more significant, if equally self-evident, refutations of Cuno’s (and 
MacGregor’s) arguments.   Nationalism is at the core of the ‘encyclopedic’ 
museum project in many, many ways.  The previous analysis has demonstrated 
that although museums may be ‘encyclopedic’ in outlook and in values – and this 
is evidently a good thing – they are national in terms of definition, legal status, and 
protection.  And overall, these great museums receive a great deal more protection 
from their governments than they do regulation or repatriation requests.  Perhaps 
the easiest way to express this critique of Cuno’s attempt to avoid the changing 
landscape in antiquities collection is to say this:  despite MacGregor’s oratory, the 
British Museum remains the British Museum, not the Encyclopedic Museum, UK 
Branch.  MacGregor’s statement regarding changing cultural and historical 
understanding –  that the British Museum is meant to recognize ‘truth as a living, 
changing thing’ –is functionally meaningless in a broad context, as this ‘truth’ 
seems to be meant to stay at the level of the objects in the collections, rather than 
inform the museum’s participation in the wider debates in society.75     
This exposes the core problem which troubles Cuno:  at the level of the 
commitment to, and academic knowledge of, the objects in a museum’s collection, 
Cuno’s arguments about the importance of the collection itself are unassailable.  
The relationship between a world-class museum and its objects may be beyond the 
comprehension of commentators from outside the discipline.  The collection is 
central to the traditional definition of the museum.76  How, then, is it 
understandable that external actors may have more ‘rights’ over a museum’s 
acquisition practices or collection than the museum itself?  Even more, the idea of 
                                                     
74 See Colin Renfrew:  ‘James Cuno sets out what might, ten years ago, have been described as the art 
museum director’s case on the proprieties of ownership and acquisition. His position is still indeed 
held by the collection of which he is Director (the Art Institute of Chicago) along with such other 
influential institutions as the Metropolitan Museum or the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. But the times 
have moved on, and other museums, including now the Getty itself, have shown themselves willing to 
adopt more careful acquisition policies and to avoid buying antiquities which might have been the 
product of looting. Cuno here, thoughtfully and with well-chosen examples, reasserts the traditional 
view.’  ‘Book Review’, The Burlington Magazine, November 2008, p.768. 
75 What better argument for the return of the Parthenon Marbles than the recognition of changing 
‘truths’?  Yet, the ‘truth’ that is recognized, by the British Museum and by the UK government, is that 
‘Elgin Marbles’ belong, as a matter of law, to Britain. 
76 See n.38 supra.   
  
Tatiana Flessas                                                                                     The Ends of the Museum  
 
 17
a museum as being its collections is central to the anxiety and dissonance that 
museum directors today experience when they begin to lose ‘control’ of the 
objects in their collections.  In the book following on from Who Owns Antiquity?, 
this focus on the object is made even more explicit.77  Therefore, it is not Cuno’s 
argument about law that is important in this context:  that is merely the response 
to a new set of repatriation strategies.  Cuno takes the law at face value; he adopts 
‘the encyclopedic’ as a blanket virtue for museums but does not propose it as a 
standard for the law.  Unsurprisingly, Cuno is caught in the same paradox as 
MacGregor, above.  If his purpose were to extend ‘encyclopedic’ values to the law, 
he would have to conclude that it would not matter at all where the contested 
object/collections were kept as long as whichever museum held them was 
displaying artefacts from different cultures in a legal regime which regulated 
museums in line with universal enlightenment values.78  Although this would seem 
to be the position that Cuno and MacGregor must be espousing, it cannot be.  
Somewhat ironically, they are arguing for a regime in which specific artefacts – 
ancient antiquities – are kept in specific museums – encyclopedic museums – and 
an ‘encyclopedic’ understanding of cultural property law does not support that 
argument. 79   Only national patrimonial laws, and international conventions supporting them, 
do that.   
 
 
   
OBJECTS AND AUTHORITY: THE REPATRIATION OF 
ARTEFACTS IN THE CONTEXT OF MUSEOLOGY 
 
Rather, Cuno’s broadsides regarding ‘national patrimonial law’ are attempts to 
intervene on the deeper questions regarding authority:  the authority to keep or 
return artefacts implicates (is part of) the authority to position the object on 
(through) the field of cultural meaning.  This authority is eroding, both for reasons 
beyond any museum’s control and as a result of decisions made over the past 
generation of museum curatorship.80  Regardless of the reasons that the objects 
should (or should not) move from one museum to another, or from a museum to 
                                                     
77 James Cuno, ed., Whose Culture?  The Promise of Museums and the Debate over Antiquities, Princeton 
University Press, 2012.  In the ‘Introduction’, Cuno writes:  ‘Museums value the discrete object for all 
that can be learned from it and from seeing it among other objects from different cultures in the 
context of the museum’s galleries.  Unlike the archaeological establishment, museums do not believe 
that unexcavated antiquities – whose archaeological context has not been scientifically recorded, or 
which didn’t come from an ancient archaeological context – are meaningless.’ 
78 There is a great deal more to be said here, which is beyond the scope of this article.  Note that the 
Louvre is in the process of opening a ‘branch’ in Abu Dhabi.  Is this an example of an ‘Encyclopedic 
Museum, Abu Dhabi branch’? or is it, as named, the Abu Dhabi Louvre?  This question is not easy to 
answer at this time.  See:  http://m.gulfnews.com/news/uae/general/abu-dhabi-louvre-opens-birth-
of-a-museum-exhibition-1.1173827.  
79 Although this might look like the ‘cultural internationalism’ perspective, the irony is that Cuno and 
others treat encyclopedic museums in a ‘nationalistic’ manner and argue for the blanket retention of 
their collections.   
80 See the discussion of the new museology, below. 
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a local group or community, what is evident in repatriation claims is that the 
museum may no longer be the primary arbiter of the meaning of the object.  
Various disciplines and histories cohere in order to make an object the focus of a 
repatriation claim, as the construction of the value of the object and the 
construction of the ‘past’ which it metonymically represents, are effected in 
tandem.81  To put an object in a museum is not only to preserve, protect, or 
conserve it; it is also to produce it as a cultural object from within a web of 
meaningful relationships.82  The same is true of taking an object out of a museum.  
However, repatriation claims deploy strategies that are usually straightforwardly 
linear, using arguments couched in terms of property or ‘ownership’ to move 
things out of museums.  The claims deliberately erode the authority of the 
museum to determine the meaning of the objects within it, instead privileging 
narratives and genealogies that favour specific and local knowledge(s) of particular 
things.  Cuno’s insistence on protecting the collection at the expense of the ‘truth’ 
of new and different understandings of the cultural value of (particular) artefacts, 
and his argument that museums should be free from the laws that are meant to 
protect against an international crime, only entrenches the problems that he is 
seeking to redress.   
At the time of the development of the ‘great’ public national museums, 
museum space was, to some extent, sacralised.  From the 18th through to the mid-
20th centuries, museums were deliberately designed to resemble other ceremonial 
spaces, such as palaces and temples. Like these other ritual spaces, museum space 
was marked off for a specific purpose, monumental, clearly defined, ceremonial 
and liminal.83  In the 19th century, these elements of the museum were self-evident, 
and self-evidently preconditions to the aesthetic and transcendent experience(s) of 
the museum visitor.  The museum ‘project’ was in keeping with museum 
architecture.84  It is this moment in museum development which many of the laws 
creating and protecting museums reflect. 85    In Civilizing Rituals, Carol Duncan 
                                                     
81 Of course, this position accepts that the development of the interrelationship between object and the 
various narratives and projects that define it is itself complex.  See, for example, Cornelia Vismann, 
‘The Love of Ruins’ in Perspectives on Science, vol. 9, no. 2 (2001), pp. 196-209.   
82 Samuel J M M Alberti, ‘Objects and the Museum’, Isis, 96:559-571 (2005),  p.561. 
83 Carol Duncan, Civilizing Rituals:  Inside Public Art Museums, Routledge, 1995, pp.10-11. 
84 In the ‘aesthetic’ ideal of the art museum, works of art are valued for ‘their unique and transcendent 
qualities […] the museum space is expected to provide a sanctuary for their contemplation.’ Carol 
Duncan,   Civilizing Rituals:  Inside Public Art Museums, Routledge, 1995, p.4.  See also Victoria 
Newhouse, Towards a New Museum,The Monacelli Press, Inc. 1998, pp. 46-7. 
85 This is most evident in the international Conventions protecting museums in time of war.  The 1954 
Hague Convention and its predecessors (the works of Vattel, the Lieber Code, the Hague Protocols) 
reflect the understanding of the secular-sacred museum rather than the modern destination model.  
The destructive effects of war on museums are balanced by some constructive ones; as Boniface and 
Fowler note, 
‘War […] is a terrible razer of museums, presumably because of their iconographic values, and it is 
presumably precisely for the same reason rather than simple functionalism or a pure love of 
scholarship that one of the priorities for postwar winners and losers is to rebuild the old museum or 
build a new one. […]’ 
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demonstrates that something remains in the museum visit or museum experience 
that hints at a lingering quasi-sacrality.  In her study of art museums, she defines 
the work of the museum as transmitting values and beliefs to visitors in the form 
of experiences that are structured as rituals:  ‘[…] a museum’s central meanings, its 
meanings as a museum, are structured through its ritual’.86 The museum is the ritual 
structure it produces.87  In this conception, the museum is a sacred space because 
it is a space in which rituals are possible, regardless of which specific values or 
experiences are being transmitted.  Put differently, rituals are not possible in 
spaces that have lost the hallmarks of sacrality.  Although museums have been 
intricately linked into the ‘formation of urban modernity’ from their inception, and 
served (and still serve) state (and other public) policies,88 a purely secular space 
does not allow for the museum-ritual. Museum visits, to remain museum visits, 
must remain a kind of rite of passage into a differently-conceived experience of a 
different world, regardless of whether that world contains academic knowledge, 
self-knowledge, is aspirational in terms of social status, or whether it represents 
partaking in a particular kind of shopping or eating.89  Museums must still create 
the sense of a threshold, and indeed the museum sheds a kind of light onto the 
objects, artefacts and location that ‘heritage’ and ‘tourism’ regimes cannot.90  
Today, the space of the museum is no longer constituted as sacred or sacrosanct in 
this way.91  Although a ‘cultural centre’ like the Centre Pompidou in Paris can 
access the marketplace or factory model of culture without losing its authority as a 
                                                                                                                                       
War is a source of objects for museums; commercial exploitation of war sites can serve museum 
projects by preserving buildings and artefacts and attracting tourism revenue, as can sites of great 
atrocities.  Boniface and Fowler, Heritage and Tourism in the Global Village p.104. 
86 Duncan, 1995, p.2 (emphasis in original). 
87 In Duncan’s view, these ‘ritual scenarios’ transmit the values and beliefs that serve the purpose(s) of the 
museum, which are partially drawn from the type of museum it is (art, archaeological, anthropological, 
etc.), and partially drawn from the social-historical moment in which the museum exists.  Duncan does 
not limit art museums to their social or political components, however.  ‘[W]hile art museums are 
understood to be both producers of ideology and products of social and political interests, they are not 
entirely reducible to these categories.  It is […] precisely the complexity of the art museum – its 
existence as a profoundly symbolic cultural object as well as a social, political, and ideological 
instrument – that makes the notion of the museum as ritual so attractive.’ (Civilizing Rituals, pp.4-5). 
88 Michaela Giebelhausen, ‘The Architecture Is the Museum’ in New Museum Theory and Practice, edited by 
Janet Marstine, Blackwell 2006, p.42. 
89 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Love of Art:  European Art Museums and their Public, Stanford University Press, 
1991. (trans Dominique Schnapper). 
90 Boniface and Fowler, Heritage and Tourism in the Global Village p.105: ‘The very word “tourism” seems 
tawdry in such a context, while the concept of “museum” is enhanced.  When human kind is battling, 
not with its past but with its own nature, then “heritage” too takes on a different dimension.’ 
91 Shifts in the architecture and uses of the museum in the 20th and 21st centuries slowly replaced the 
‘temple’ model with the ‘destination’ model of public space: a place where one could visit the café or 
the shop without entering the exhibition halls; where curators and directors also must think about 
tourism and blockbuster exhibitions as means of raising revenues.  This is predominantly true in the 
‘new’ museum.  Here, visitors are meant to enter into a predominantly social, commercial space, in 
which the threshold of the museum and the huge and very expensive special events and exhibitions 
generate awareness in the visitor of not only ‘high’ culture but also the importance and presence of 
revenue-gathering, corporate sponsorship, and international status. See:  Kylie Message, ‘The New 
Museum’, Theory, Culture and Society 23(2-3), pp. 603-606. 
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museum space,92 the turn away from the original conception of the great national 
museums93 gives rise to increased anxiety about the museum project. Partially as a 
result of this kind of change, Patty Gerstenblith and others have recently 
commented that entering the museum in this century and this climate may be 
similar to entering a warehouse – with catering facilities.94 The museum in this 
view is in danger of being a mere repository of objects, not a celebration of culture 
and its possibilities, a danger only exacerbated by increasing repatriation claims 
which in themselves may also desacralize the museum. 95   
The legal conflicts and claims around repatriation and deaccessioning can be 
understood not only as specific problems for specific museums, but as expressions 
of a larger shift in the museum project. The museum has been critiqued as 
representing a point of crisis, or in crisis, since the early part of the 20th century.  
Museums have been seen as places where objects, torn from their contexts, are 
placed in a terrible and meaningless proximity to each other.96  Paul Valery, Walter 
Benjamin, and later, Theodor Adorno (among others) have all discussed the 
phenomenon of the museum’s relationship with its objects, and the ways in which 
collections and collectors express a certain object-related habitation of 
modernity.97  Douglas Crimp argues that the context of the museum and its 
                                                     
92 ‘Its scale, high-tech vernacular, and unusual color scheme were bold and discordant.  The project 
represented a new departure:  a cultural center that combined diverse functions such as a library, 
videotheque, temporary exhibition spaces, a bookshop, cafes, and restaurants, and the city’s museum 
of modern art.  The Pompidou functions as a multidisciplinary cultural factory which attracts a variety 
of audiences.’ Michaela Giebelhausen, ‘The Architecture Is the Museum’ in New Museum Theory and 
Practice, edited by Janet Marstine, Blackwell 2006, p.56. 
93 Separate from the question of repatriation, on the DCMS’s website there is a clear ‘steer’ on the 
modern museum’s purposes: ‘When it comes to the Museums and Galleries sector we have four main 
priorities: 
• Ensuring that children have the opportunity to enjoy a vibrant cultural and sporting life  
• Opening institutions to the widest possible cross section of people  
• Ensuring that the creative, leisure and tourist industries provide the maximum possible benefit to the 
economy  
• Ensuring our museums and galleries are exciting, modern and provide real value for money  
By focusing on these objectives we aim to improve education, social cohesion, regional regeneration, 
the quality of our institutions and our cultural life.’ Available at: 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/museums_and_galleries/default.aspx.  
94 Patty Gerstenblith, ‘Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum Collections and the Fiduciary 
Obligations of Museums to the Public’, 11 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 409, 414 
(2003).  
95 Kevin Hetherington discusses how museums are experienced in modernity.  He states that ‘Museums 
are no longer just defined in terms of their gallery spaces.  In a world of simulation and consumerism, 
of global tourism and heritage preservation and of entrepreneurial public-private regeneration of urban 
space, the city itself has become museumified.  […]  Museums have adapted to the challenges of 
capitalism in ways that have challenged their former high art mission.’  (citation omitted) Kevin 
Hetherington, ‘‘Museum’, in Theory, Culture and Society 23(2-3), pp. 597- 603 (2006), at p. 602. 
    ‘As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century…Antoine-Chrysostome Quatremere de Quincy 
lamented the tearing of objects from their original context.’  Janet Marstine, New Museum Theory and 
Practice, Blackwell, 2006, p.15.  See also Victoria Newhouse, Towards a New Museum,The Monacelli Press, 
Inc., 1998, pp. 47-51. 
97 ‘Theodor Adorno used the German word “museal” […] to describe objects that are no longer 
connected to the culture that produced them or to the present.  He declared […] “Museum and 
mausoleum are connected by more than a phonetic association.  Museums are like the family 
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changing role(s) are a site where modernity, as both a process and as a discourse, is 
clearly expressed.98  He argues that ‘the history of museology is a history of the 
various attempts to deny the heterogeneity of the museum, to reduce it to a 
homogenous system or series’.99  From the inception of the modern museum 
project, the radical heterogeneity of the objects in the museum and their equally-
radical ‘object-ness’ was critiqued by theorists who questioned the existence of any 
possible homogenizing discourse, or indeed, the possibility that such a discourse 
might exist.  Instead, the multiplicity of objects and their meanings demonstrated 
how necessary it was to find a new way of thinking about the connections between 
objects and knowledge.100  This is a different view of the value of the collections 
that make up the encyclopedic museum. 
The ‘new museology’ inaugurated by Peter Vergo in 1988101 was to some 
extent a response to these kinds of critiques filtered through the social sciences of 
the mid-20th century; it brought together the research and social theory that 
questioned the ongoing validity of the ‘temple’ model of the museum.  Vergo 
proposed that the acquisition and display of objects in a museum necessarily 
represent the assignment of values to these objects and the cultures from which 
they come.  This formulation of curatorship no longer acts as a criticism of the 
‘value-neutral’ position of the object in the authoritative, ‘temple’ model of the 
museum; it has come to replace that model. 102  A specific example of the new 
museology may be seen by looking at Charles Saumarez Smith’s warning, in the 
same volume in 1989, that the continued meaning of the museum rests on objects 
being seen as mobile and culturally-defined rather than static and best appreciated 
in an a-historical or a-contextual space.  He writes that  
 
                                                                                                                                       
sepulchers of works of art.  They testify to the neutralization of culture.” Janet Marstine, New Museum 
Theory and Practice, Blackwell, 2006, at p.15.   
98 Douglas Crimp, On the Museum’s Ruins, The MIT Press 1993. 
99 Ibid, p.54. 
100 Crimp discusses Flaubert’s critique of the museum’s relationship with disparate and often fragmentary 
objects, quoting Flaubert’s claim that ‘”The fiction is that a repeated metonymic displacement of 
fragment for totality, object to label, series of objects to series of labels, can still produce a 
representation which is somehow adequate to a nonlinguistic universe.  Such a fiction is a result of an 
uncritical belief in the notion that ordering and classifying, that is to say, the spatial juxtaposition of 
fragments, can produce a representational understanding of the world.  Should the fiction disappear, 
there is nothing left of the Museum but ‘bric-a-brac,’ a heap of meaningless and valueless fragments 
which are incapable of substituting themselves either metonymically for the original objects or 
metaphorically for their representations.’  Ibid, p.53.  See also:  Tony Bennett, The Birth of the Museum:  
History, Theory, Politics, Routledge, 1995.   
101 Peter Vergo, The New Museology, Reaktion Books, 1989. 
102 Vergo’s manifesto is the foundation for much of museum practice today, especially in anthropological 
and archaeological museums.  No one would disagree that museums contain and transmit value 
judgments in all acts of collecting, acquiring, exhibiting and retaining material, nor that ‘Beyond the 
captions, the information panels, the accompanying catalogue, the press handout, there is a subtext 
comprising innumerable diverse, often contradictory strands, woven from the wishes and ambitions, 
the intellectual or political or social or educational aspirations and preconceptions of the museum 
director, the curator, the scholar, the designer, the sponsor – to say nothing of the society, the political 
or social or educational system which nurtured all these people and in so doing left its stamp on them.’ 
The New Museology, pp.2-3. 
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One of the most insistent problems that museums face is precisely the idea 
that artefacts can be, and should be, divorced from their original context of 
ownership and use, and redisplayed in a different context of meaning, which 
is regarded as having a superior authority.  […] Museums are assumed to 
operate outside the zone in which artefacts change in ownership and 
epistemological meaning.  Yet anyone who has attended closely to the 
movement of artefacts in a museum will know that the assumption that […] 
objects are somehow static, safe, and out of the territory in which their 
meaning and use can be transformed, is demonstrably false.103   
 
This position is now accepted as valid without question.  The primacy and fluidity 
of objects and their histories is no longer seen as antithetical to the museum 
project.  There is an established nexus of scholarship at the intersection of 
anthropology, art history, science studies, and other disciplines that has taken the 
manifesto of the new museology to heart.  For example, Samuel Alberti writes in 
2005 that ‘object biographies’ are an exceptionally fruitful way to ‘approach the 
history of museums […]’.104  Almost twenty years later, his project follows the 
route advocated by Vergo, Saumarez Smith, and others leading the call for a new 
approach to museums and their scholarship.  
The arguments around the repatriation of antiquities occur on this landscape 
as well as across the legal instruments and strategies to which Cuno and others 
object. Evidently the transformations in meaning and use contemplated by 
Saumarez Smith cannot come purely from within the museological establishment.  
Here, however, the question arises whether the definition of the ‘collection’ and its 
value can continue to be determined largely by the curator (or the museum 
director).  Modern museology assumes the multivocal eruption into speech of 
objects and collections that formerly spoke only with the voice of the curator.   In 
the new museology, the battle to control the meaning of the object, that is, to 
provide the ultimate frame for it, or what Valerie Casey calls the ‘legislated’ value of 
art and artefacts, is ongoing.105  In a very real way, this is a good thing.  Saumarez 
Smith writes that to silence the narratives of mutable and dissonant meanings and 
histories is to be in danger of forgetting ‘the high idealism and the academic 
intentions which lay behind the foundation of museums’.106 Rather than seeing the 
                                                     
103 Charles Saumarez Smith, ‘Museums, Artefacts, and Meanings’ in Peter Vergo, ed. The New Museology, 
Reaktion, 1989, p.9. 
104 ‘We can trace the careers of museum things from acquisition to arrangement to viewing, through the 
different contexts and the many changes of value incurred by these shifts.  In doing so we study a 
series of relationships surrounding objects, first on the way to the museum and then as part of the 
collection.  These are relationships between people and people, between objects and objects, and 
between objects and people.  […]  In this conception, the museum becomes a vessel for the bundle of 
relationships enacted through each of the thousands of specimens on display and in store.’  Samuel J M 
M Alberti, Isis (2005) 96:559-571, p.561. 
105 Valerie Casey, ‘Staging Meaning:  Performance in the Modern Museum’, The Drama Review 49, 3 
(T187), Fall 2005, p.80. 
106 Charles Saumarez Smith, ‘Museums, Artefacts, and Meanings’ in Peter Vergo, ed., The New Museology, 
Reaktion, 1989, p.9. 
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emphasis on polyvalence and mutability as signs of ‘spoiled’ sacred space, we 
might more accurately see them as guaranteeing a new set of rituals and expert 
discourses, that is, ensuring the survival of the old museum project in a new 
form.107 
  In light of the past 30 or more years of this approach to museum 
collections, the unavoidable result is that at some point objects may escape 
curators, and the museum project itself, entirely.  This gestures beyond the 
problems presented by the conflation of objects and knowledge, or museums and 
discourse.  Rather, the problem is the ‘free for all’ of materiality itself.  Where 
history, meaning and contextualization of collecting practices go, must the objects 
themselves logically follow?  What are the justifications for retaining objects when 
they are valued as objects?  As Cuno writes in his essay ‘The Object of Art 
Museums’: ‘I want to focus on the object because while museums do many things 
[…] nothing is more important than adding to our nation’s cultural legacy and 
providing visitors access to it, if only […] one object at a time.’108  Cuno argues 
that the physical presence of the object is central to the research and scholarship 
that ultimately gives both the knowledge and the object its meaning.109  Although 
he is discussing the art museum here, surely the same argument must apply in the 
realm of antiquities, which are best (if not only) appreciated in their materiality.  
Actors in this field are in something like a cleft stick, or a double bind:  on the one 
hand, there is the primacy of the object, a primacy which is in explicit in much of 
the writing of curators, historians, and commentators on material culture.  On the 
other hand, the museum will not survive as a (mere) collection of objects.  The 
new museology has removed much of the aura of sacrality from museums; it has 
also valorised the life of objects beyond their value to, or in, the museum.   At 
issue now is how the project(s) and meanings of the museum have changed, and 
whether they are adequately protected from erosion.110  Certainly, the endless 
                                                     
107 See Jens Andermann and Silke Arnold-de Simine, ‘Introduction:  Memory, Community and the New 
Museum’, Theory, Culture and Society Vol.29(1): 3-13 (2012).  It might even be said that the old museum 
project survives in its old form:  Oliver Impey quotes Francis Bacon on the necessities of a learned 
man in 1594, which include ‘”a goodly, huge cabinet, wherein whatsoever the hand of man by exquisite 
art or engine has made rare in stuff, form or motion; whatsoever singularity, chance, and the shuffle of 
things hath produced; whatsoever Nature has wrought in things that want life and may be kept; shall 
be sorted and included.”’  He then comments:  ‘museums are still in the business of “keeping and 
sorting” the products of Man and Nature and in promoting understanding of their significance.’  The 
new museology has not significantly changed that role, and nor has the development of the concept of 
the encyclopedic museum.  Oliver Impey and Arthur MacGregor, The Origins of Museums:  The Cabinet of 
Curiosities in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe (xxx), p.xvii. 
108  ‘The Object of Art Museums’ in Whose Muse? Art Museums and the Public Trust, James Cuno, ed., 
Princeton University Press and Harvard Art Museums, 2006, p. 52.   
109 ‘The museum is not just a treasure house, it is also a center of a very special kind of research and 
education.  […] In the art museum, research and teaching are object-based:  prompted by the object, 
engaged with the object, and offered up by the particular way objects are experienced in space as 
physical things made of matter of a certain size and scale, worked in a certain way, and presented under 
certain circumstances, whether they be those of the gallery or study room.’  Id. 
110 For an argument that ‘museum as process’ restores the functionality of the art museum, see Carol S 
Jeffers, ‘Museum as Process’ in Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 37, No. 1, (Spring 2003), pp. 107-119.  
To some extent, ‘sacrality’ has been replaced by trust in the museum visitor, which is a wonderful 
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return to ‘education’, ‘community’, and ‘experience’ cannot protect museums from 
losing their mandate over the keeping and ordering of the things they contain.111  
If the objects are stripped of the aura, the extra meaning that ‘being in the 
museum’ gives them – whatever that is – then there is no valid reason to keep 
them in the museum once a plausible competing claim as to their meaning, use, or 
value has been made.  
In order to combat this problem, museum professionals attempt to define 
their authority more broadly than is stated in their founding documents or mission 
statements.  James N Wood, Director of the Art Institute of Chicago from 1980-
2004, identifies eight sources of authority for the modern art museum:  
nourishment, expertise, hierarchy, memory, conservation, architecture, mission, 
and leadership.  He states that  
 
The first and indispensable type of authority that legitimizes the art museum 
is what I call the authority of nourishment.  First and foremost we are our 
collections, and it is assumed that these original works of art, selected for 
their aesthetic quality and historical significance, provide something essential 
to society.112   
 
It is no gift to museums challenged by repatriation claims to base nourishment as 
definitely on ownership of the ‘original works of art’ as Wood does.  The 
‘something essential’ they provide to society may be provided in a different 
museum, in a different country or by a different narrative than that emanating 
from the Art Institute of Chicago.  Without disagreeing with the substance of 
Wood’s argument, it is possible to point out the dangers of basing the identity, 
utility or meaning of the museum on the specificity of its objects.   
At this point, the concerns expressed by increasing numbers of repatriation 
claims come into focus.  Perhaps the only way to retain objects under current 
circumstances is to speak in the voice of the museum itself, and claim the objects 
as some part of its essence – and this article suggests that this is the underlying 
purpose of the emphasis on the encyclopedic museum, as it was in the 2002 
                                                                                                                                       
result.  For a discussion of the museum visitor in Britain in the 1980’s, see Nick Merriman, Beyond the 
Glass Case:  the Past, the Heritage and the Public in Britain, Leicester University Press, 1991. 
111 For example, the reorganization of the Smithsonian’s Native American collections in the wake of the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (1990) was fuelled by the desire to respond 
to the critiques of colonialism and insensitivity made regarding the Smithsonian’s storage of hundreds 
of human skeletons and associated tribal objects.  For a discussion of the development of the New 
Museum of the American Indian in light of the repatriation of human skeletons and associated objects, 
see:  C. Timothy McKeown, ‘Considering Repatriation Legislation as an Option:  The National 
Museum of the American Indian (NMAIA) & The Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)’ in UTIMUT-Past Heritage-Future Partnerships:  Discussions on Repatriation in 
the 21st Century, Mille Gabriel and Jens Dahl, eds., International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 
Copenhagen 2008 – Document No. 122, pp.134-147.  Available at:  
http://www.iwgia.org/publications/search-pubs?publication_id=28. 
112 James N Wood, ‘The Authorities of the American Art Museum’ in Whose Muse? Art Museums and the 
Public Trust, James Cuno, ed., 2006, Princeton University Press and Harvard Art Museums, p. 108. 
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attempt by the Directors of 18 of the world’s most important museums to 
inaugurate the ‘Universal Museum.’ It is an attempt to manage the (paradoxical) 
results of hyper-valuing objects.113  Museums assuredly provide a context in which 
the development of culture can occur; however this article argues that linking the 
development of culture too closely to the retention of objects is an error.  If 
‘universalism’, or the ‘encyclopedic museum’, relies on amassing and preserving 
objects, the project is doomed to failure.  Objects in modernity are 
overdetermined; the artefacts found in a museum exist at the nexus of a 
constellation of different theories, uses and meanings that arise from source 
communities, legal instruments and activists, archaeologists, anthropologists, 
historians, dealers and ‘looters’ as well as from the art historians and curators who 
have responsibility for them.  The repatriation debates are to some extent the result 
of the emphasis on the materiality of culture, an emphasis in which museum 
curators and directors have joined nation states and cultural commentators. 
What the repatriation debates demonstrate, uncontroversially, is that the 
power to frame the objects is crucial to the struggle to retain them.  Equally, they 
demonstrate that the power to frame certain objects will rarely, if ever again, rest 
solely with any specific museum.  This is particularly true of the conflicts 
surrounding the acquisition, retention, and repatriation of antiquities, which 
represent in many cases the Platonic ideal of the museum artefact:  valuable, rare, 
thought-provoking, and suggestive as to context and meaning, signifying both as 
artefact and as art.  The crucial point here is that the ‘repatriation problem’ must be seen 
as one strand of museum theory as much as an area of law, and the genealogy of this 
phenomenon has to include the changing theories and practices within museology 
itself. The retentionist language, policies, and statutory controls in this area are all 
attempts to safeguard both ownership and this particular power of interpretation 
and dissemination.  In less conflicted times, the two were conceptualized as 
making up one complex of privileges:  ownership and interpretation cross-defined 
the museum artefact.   This complex no longer functions smoothly.  The result 
thus far has been to attempt to separate ownership and interpretation, most often 
by retaining the object while allowing the power to interpret to be shared by 
others outside the museum.114  Less often, the strategy has been to let the object 
go while retaining the authority of interpretation.  (Smaller museums and 
museums with more specific community- or educationally-based missions – 
museums which would not define themselves as ‘encyclopedic’ – seem to be 
choosing a different path, in which both kinds of authority are gently eroding or 
transforming into a genuinely collaborative set of projects with the surrounding 
communities.)  For the ‘encyclopedic’ museums however, these solutions have 
been exposed as half-measures, eroding the museums’ legitimacy while not solving 
                                                     
113 ‘Declaration of the Importance and Value of Universal Museums’, available at:  
http://icom.museum/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/ICOM_News/2004-1/ENG/p4_2004-1.pdf.  
114 How the British Museum handles the controversy around the ownership of the Elgin/Parthenon 
Marbles is an excellent example of this.  See:  
http://www.britishmuseum.org/about_us/news_and_press/statements/parthenon_sculptures.aspx  
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the problem of how to manage their relationship to the objects in their 
collections.115  Cuno’s work is representative of the attempt to rejoin ownership 
and interpretation, but it fails because the developments in museology and the 
landscapes of both ownership and interpretation in modernity make this 






Being unable to return to past certainties, some of the great national and 
international museums have sought to undermine measures that challenge their 
right to ‘own’ – that is, acquire and retain – illicitly-trafficked ancient objects. As a 
result, these museums increasingly valorise the authority they derive from ownership 
over the authority that was previously ascribed to objects themselves as expressions 
of cultural, historical and artistic knowledge. Recent statements and texts reveal a 
consensus view that a museum which cannot retain its art and artefacts will not 
survive in a meaningful way.  This may be true; it certainly points to the truth that 
for the great museums the utility of the brute force of ownership in a property-
based culture cannot be overestimated.  Nevertheless, this recourse to the concept 
of ‘ownership’ is misguided.  First, the availability of this protection is much more 
limited than commonly imagined; second, replacing object-based authority with 
owner-based authority does not solve the problem.  Indeed, even if an 
unproblematic ‘ownership’ regime were possible, privileging a right of exclusive 
possession is antithetical to the values of the enlightenment museum.  The 
ongoing commitment to public education and personal transformation may not 
even truly require legal ownership of the collection.117   
Art museums, National and Archaeological Museums, and Anthropological 
Museums – and related Collections – each have their own Mission statements, 
Charters, Founding Act, Funding and Management Agreements, and other 
documentation setting out their ‘ownership’ of the objects within their care.  
Unfortunately, this ownership is not, and cannot, be protected from attack.  The 
law in this area attempts to reconcile some of the complex inter-relations between 
the (legally-protected) space of museums and the production of culture.  Given 
the nature of cultural objects, ‘ownership’ must always be partial, and mediated by 
politics and public opinion. This is entirely in line with Cuno’s argument regarding 
                                                     
115 One solution may be to constitute, or re-constitute, the museum as a space which can be protected 
rather than a collection of objects which can be guaranteed eternally.   
116 See n.65, supra. 
117 The numbers of ‘imaginary’ and ‘digital’ museums that exist on the internet or as art installations or on 
Facebook or temporarily in other ways are increasing.  ‘Museum’ in these cases may merely be a 
homonym to ‘museum’ as it is used in repatriation discourse.  However, it is worth noting the 
fragmentation and metamorphoses of the term, as its appropriation in these kinds of projects points to 
the ongoing relevance and authority of the concept of the museum overall. 
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the fluidity of culture, as it is with Renfrew and Brodie’s arguments about the 
importance of provenance.  In this environment, title to ancient artefacts that have 
unknown provenances and fictional export documents should not be settled once 
and for all.  To do so would be to enshrine the notion of ‘barbarians’ into the very 
heart of the museum project:  although artefacts require protection from 
destruction, they do not require protection from the currents of culture itself.  The 
validity of the concept of ‘encyclopedic’ or ‘universal’ or ‘enlightenment’ depends 
on the free motion of artefacts, and the adherence to laws that respect the 
complexity of knowledge, heritage, and beauty rather than the market in broken, 
unprovenanced and rootless objects.  Therefore, the only conclusion possible is 
that museums must repatriate antiquities and they must abide by the laws 
promulgated for the protection of others.  To behave differently is to reframe the 
museum project indeed, from encyclopedic to autocratic; from protecting the 
public good to protecting the rights of the collector; it is to take a large step 
backwards.  
 
 
